THE DETERMINANTS OF TAKEOVERS: RECENT EVIDENCE FROM U.S. THRIFTS by Cebenoyan, Fatma et al.
  
 
 
 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF TAKEOVERS:  
RECENT EVIDENCE FROM U.S. THRIFTS 
 
Fatma Cebenoyan 
A. Sinan Cebenoyan 
Elizabeth S. Cooperman 
 
  
S-CG-02-10 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series     CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Research Group 
The Determinants of Takeovers: Recent Evidence from U.S. Thrifts 
 
Fatma Cebenoyan 
Assistant Professor 
Hunter College, City University of New York 
A. Sinan Cebenoyan* 
Professor, Hofstra University, 
And Adjunct Professor, 
Stern School of Business, New York University 
and 
Elizabeth S. Cooperman 
University of Colorado at Denver 
 
December 10, 2002 
 
 
JEL Classification: G34, G32, G33, G21 
Key Words: Cost Inefficiency, Depository Institutions; Thrifts; Takeovers 
*Correspondent Author, Address: Department of Finance, Frank G. Zarb School of 
Business, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY 11549-1340; (516) 463-5702; Fax (516) 
463-4834; finazc@hofstra.edu .  Fatma Cebenoyan acknowledges support from a CUNY 
Research Grant, Sinan Cebenoyan received support from a Summer Research Grant from 
the Frank G. Zarb School of Business at Hofstra University, and Elizabeth Cooperman 
thanks the University of Colorado-Denver for funds to help collect part of the data for 
this study.   
  
The Determinants of Takeovers: Recent Evidence from U.S. Thrifts 
 
 
                                                                 Abstract 
 
This paper uses a two-step methodology to examine the relationship between managerial 
cost inefficiency and the takeover of U.S. thrifts during a period of market liberalization 
and widespread takeover activity, 1994 to 2000.  In the first stage using stochastic cost 
frontiers, we estimate controllable managerial cost inefficiency scores for all stock firms 
operating each year in 1994 to 2000.   In a second stage, we use these scores to examine 
correlates of takeovers, focusing on cost inefficiency.  For takeovers by banks, we find a 
significant negative relationship between cost inefficiency and takeover, suggesting an 
exit of more cost efficient firms from the thrift industry during this period.  However,  
takeovers by thrifts are associated with other characteristics.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
The Determinants of Takeovers: Recent Evidence from U.S. Thrifts 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
      The landscape for global financial services has changed dramatically with the 
liberalization of regulatory environments in the recent past. Among other changes, this 
liberalization led to numerous mergers and takeovers across different types of financial 
institutions, and an overall wave of consolidations.  This is particularly the case for the 
U.S. thrift industry, which experienced significant takeover activity during the later 
1990’s.  Legislation during this period encouraged merger activity, as the removal of 
previous geographical restrictions for banks and thrifts under the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.  Also, the removal of preferential tax 
treatment of bad debt reserves under a special provision of the Small Business Jobs 
Protection Act of 1996 eliminated previous impediments for thrift to bank conversions 
and mergers.  Finally, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Modernization Act) of 
1999 by allowing the creation of Financial Holding Companies which could practice all 
functions ‘financial in nature’ under one umbrella removed further deterrents to 
bank/thrift mergers. 
     Although the thrift industry has been very profitable in the last decade, there may be 
significant implications for the long term viability of this sector if more or less efficient 
firms are being taken over.  The characteristics of firms that have been taken over in a 
liberalized market are of interest to academics, regulators, and managers as well to 
determine if deregulation has promoted a healthier financial services industry.  Thrift 
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acquisitions may also provide insights as a relatively homogenous sub-sample of 
financial institutions, allowing researchers to generalize to a larger, more diverse 
population.  In this paper, we examine the characteristics of U.S. thrifts that were taken 
over during this period of liberalization, focusing on the relationship between managerial 
cost inefficiency and takeovers.  
      Although characteristics of target thrifts have never been examined, a few studies 
have examined the relationship between bank takeovers of banks and firm characteristics.   
These include Hannan and Rhoades (1987), Moore (1996), Hadlock, Houston, and 
Ryngaert (1999), and Wheelock and Wilson (2000).   
      These studies focus on whether mergers serve to filter out unfit firms from the 
banking industry, as in what Hannan and Rhoades (1987) refer to as a ‘driving out bad 
management’ hypothesis.  This hypothesis predicts that poorly managed thrifts will be 
culled out of the industry, as acquirers seek to gain from turning these firms around.  
Similarly, Moore (1996), notes that mergers may remove banks that are “out of step” in a 
rapidly changing environment, allowing more productive use of resources and enhancing 
the industry’s profitability.  Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert (1999) point out, bank 
managers have greater control over whether or not they are acquired, since few hostile 
takeovers are allowed by regulators.  From this perspective, they examine the relationship 
between takeovers and performance and ownership characteristics as well. 
     Hannan and Rhoades (1987) studying a sample of Texas banks from 1971 to 1982, 
find no support for a bad management hypothesis, with insignificant relationships 
between takeovers and firm profitability.  Similarly, Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert 
(1999), examining paired samples of large acquired and not acquired banks from 1982 to 
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1992, find insignificant relationships between takeovers and profitability and managerial 
ownership factors.  Moore (1996), however, studying a large sample of banks from 1993 
to June 1996, finds a higher probability of takeover for firms with lower profitability.  
His results support the ‘driving out bad management hypothesis’ as both lower 
profitability and lower market success (as proxied by a lower market share) lead to higher 
probability of takeovers.   
     Since managers may have greater control over cost efficiency versus profitability 
factors in the banking industry, an examination of cost efficiency may be a better test of a 
bad management hypothesis.  Wheelock and Wilson (2000) is the only previous study 
that examines this relationship for the banking industry.  Unlike, the other studies that use 
logit models, Wheelock and Wilson use a proportional hazard model to find predictive 
determinants of a bank’s survival time to both failure and takeover.  They follow a large 
sample of banks with at least $50 million in assets in existence in 1984 through 1993.  
Their model includes proxies for managerial cost inefficiency, and other firm-specific 
and market variables.  They find different determinants for bank failures versus 
acquisitions.  While inefficiency increases the probability that a bank will fail, it reduces 
the probability that a bank will be acquired.  Wheelock and Wilson (2000) note that 
although inefficient banks might be “ripe for takeover” for their turnaround potential, 
“the costs of reorganizing an inefficient bank and the potential for hidden problems that 
inefficiency might signal tend to discourage the acquisition of inefficient banks.” Their 
results contrast with previous studies examining bank mergers in the 1980’s that find 
little evidence of post-merger cost efficiency gains for banks (see Calomiris and 
Karceski, 2000).  Their results also contrast with findings by Trimbath, Frydman, and 
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Frydman (2002), using the same methodology, of a significant positive relationship 
between cost inefficiency and takeovers for a large sample of non-financial, Fortune 500 
firms during 1980 to 1997.  Their differing results may reflect average acquirer 
motivations across diverse industries versus a single, more regulated banking industry.    
        As the only study examining managerial cost inefficiency and takeovers for the 
banking industry, Wheelock and Wilson’s (2000) results have not been confirmed for the 
liberalized takeover market of the later 1990’s, which encompassed different conditions 
and a less restricted regulatory regime.  Similarly, by examining banks that often are 
involved in very diverse activities, their aggregate results may smooth over differences 
among banks, specializing in different types of lending. 
      In this paper, we add to the previous literature on the characteristics that affect a 
financial services firm’s acquisition by: (1) being first to examine the relationship 
between controllable managerial cost efficiency and other factors for takeovers for the 
thrift industry; (2) choosing our sample period for years that had the least amount of 
regulatory restrictions, with the liberalization of depository institution markets in the later 
1990’s; and (3) focusing on relatively homogenous firms in the thrift industry avoiding 
heterogeneity that is often found in the banking industry that could distort aggregate 
results. 
       We examine the relationship between cost inefficiency and thrift takeovers using a 
two-stage estimation.  In the first stage, we estimate inefficiency scores for individual 
thrifts for each year using a stochastic cost-frontier methodology.  In the second stage, we 
perform maximum likelihood logit models using the 2,533 lagged, firm-year inefficiency 
scores that we calculated, along with other firm-specific and market characteristics.   
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Though our focus is the target rather than the acquirer, nevertheless we conduct a 
multinomial logit analysis as a final test to detect differences in takeover attributes based 
on the identity of the acquirer, whether it is a bank or another thrift.  Based on our general 
logit model for all takeovers, we find results consistent with Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000) of a significant, negative relationship between cost inefficiency and takeovers. 
Our multinomial logit results indicate quite different attributes for takeovers depending 
on who the acquirer is.  Takeovers by commercial banks are associated with higher cost 
efficiency and a more rapidly growing market.  However, takeovers by another thrift are 
correlated with larger size overall, but lower thrift-market share.    
     The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the data and the methodology.  
Section 3 presents the empirical results, followed by a summary and conclusions in 
Section 4.   
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
      We collect data on thrifts from the Office of Thrift Supervision Consolidated 
Statements of Condition and Operations, as recorded by Thomson Financial for all U.S. 
stock-chartered thrifts operating in 1994-2000.  Our inefficiency scores are estimated 
annually using data of all stock thrifts in every year during the testing period of seven 
years.   At this stage, the number of thrifts range from 865 in 1994 to 650 in 2000.  We 
lose a minimal number of firm-years (21 in all) during this estimation period due to firms 
with missing information.   
       To examine characteristics of takeovers, previous studies have used either: (1) a logit  
model to examine ex-post characteristics that are correlates of takeovers; or (2) a 
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proportional hazard model to predict the time to (takeover) hazard.  Logit models are 
simpler and require fewer restrictive assumptions, such as constant proportionality.  
However, they can be biased as predictive models for the temporal risk of takeover (see 
Trimbath, Frydman, and Frydman, 2002).  Since the purpose of our study is to examine 
ex-post correlates of takeovers versus prediction, we use the simpler logit approach.  
Trimbath, Frydman, and Frydman (2000) also note a potential bias for logit models that 
use beginning of the period characteristics of firms that are not taken over until much 
later. We avoid this bias by using the methodology used by DeFond and Park (1999), 
where all existing thrifts in 1994 are followed through 2000 and non-target thrifts are 
included every year, but targets are only included only in the year of their takeover. 
These procedures yield 2,533 firm-year observations, including 401 takeovers. 
      To identify takeovers, we used the Thomson Savings Directory for 1994 to 2001 
(Skokie, Illinois: Thomson Financial Publishing Company) and the National Information 
Center, Federal Reserve System website for acquisition year verifications.  Other data 
sources used for other independent control variables included:  (1) U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of the Census County and City Data Book; and (2) County and City 
Extra: Annual Metro, City, and County Data Book (Lanham, Maryland: Bernan Press, 
ed. by Courtenay M. Slater and George E. Hall, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis: 
Regional Accounts Data, Annual State Personal Income, and Annual Population by State 
on the BEA website (www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/).   
2.1  Cost Inefficiency Measures 
     In this paper the economic efficiency concept we employ is cost inefficiency.  Cost 
inefficiency gives a measure of how much a particular firm’s cost deviates from the best 
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practice firm’s minimum cost for the same output under the same conditions.   This 
information is derived from a cost function that evaluates the firm’s variable costs in 
terms of variable outputs, variable input prices, fixed inputs, random error and 
inefficiency. It can be stated as: 
                                                C ),,,,( cc vuzwyf=                      (1) 
where C  equals variable costs, , vector of variable outputs, , a vector of prices of 
variable inputs, and  are quantities of any fixed inputs included to account for their 
effects on variable costs, since they may be substitutable or complementary with variable 
inputs.   The terms and v  are, respectively, inefficiency and random error terms.   To 
estimate the error term in equation (1) and in turn calculate each firm’s cost inefficiency 
index , we estimate the following popular multiproduct translog cost specification 
(suppressing individual thrift subscripts):
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As pointed out by previous studies, the translog function provides consistent inefficiency 
rankings relative to other functional forms.  It also has the advantage of simplicity.2 
                                                          
1 See Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Broeck (1977), Jondrow et al (1982) for a 
description of this methodology.  For more recent applications, see Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and 
Hudgins (1993), Berger and Mester (1997) and Rogers (1998).   
 
2For greater precision in calculating efficiency scores, Berger and Mester (1997) suggest the use of a 
Fourier-flexible function form, which is less restrictive than a translog cost function.  However, the translog 
form is easier to use, and for ranking decisions, studies demonstrate that it provides similar rankings as 
other forms.  
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     In this estimation, five outputs, jy , are used: (1) 1-4 family mortgage loans and 
mortgage-backed securities; (2) multifamily and nonresidential mortgage loans; (3) 
nonmortgage loans including consumer and commercial loans and lease financing; (4) 
cash and other security investments including U.S. government and agency securities, 
municipals, and other securities; and (5) construction and land loans, and real estate and 
service-corporation investment.  The prices of two variable inputs, , are used: (1) labor 
and (2) deposits and other borrowings.  We measure the price of labor as total 
expenditures on employees divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees at 
the end of the year.  The price of deposits is total interest expense divided by total 
deposits and other borrowings.  We further impose the usual linear homogeneity in input 
price restrictions in estimation.  Two fixed input quantities, , are also included: the 
dollar value of physical capital (premises and other fixed assets) and the dollar value of 
financial equity capital.
kw
z
3 
 
 2.2  Logit Model 
     In the second stage of the estimation, we use the maximum likelihood (MLE) logit 
models to examine the relationship between acquisitions and cost inefficiency and other 
factors.  The MLE logit model permits an analysis of the binary dependent variable of a 
                                                          
3See Rogers (1998) and Berger and Mester (1997) for a detailed description of the methodology, which this 
section heavily draws from.  The input and output measures are similar to those used by Cebenoyan, 
Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins (1993) and Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1993).  We use a 
financial intermediation approach, following the arguments of Sealey and Lindley (1977) to specify thrift 
inputs and outputs.  This method assumes a firm uses physical capital, deposits, other borrowings and labor 
as inputs to produce earning assets.  Results of the frontier estimations are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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thrift being taken over versus continuing to operate independently.  The MLE logit model 
is based on the cumulative logistic probability function and is specified as:4 
                                    )(
1
1
)(
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=+=                                       (3) 
where e is the base of natural logarithms, and α  and β  are the respective estimated 
model coefficients for the independent variables, X . 
       The cross-sectional regression to be estimated for each of the respective sub-samples 
is: 
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where: 
=iP
CINEFF
 1 if a thrift is taken over during the merger wave of 1995 to 2001, 0, otherwise, 
 cost inefficiency score, =i
=iSIZE  log of total assets, 
=iCAP  total equity/total assets, 
=iMSH  market share of state thrift assets, 
=iTRAD the percentage of traditional home-mortgage assets, 
=iREPOS  the percentage of repossessed assets, 
=iMSA  dummy variable indicating operation in a Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
                                                          
4See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981) and Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, and Lee (1982) for reviews of 
maximum likelihood logit models. 
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=iGROWTH population growth percentage of the state in which the thrift operates,  
=iYEAR year dummies, and   
=iε a random error term. 
     As in previous studies (Hannan and Rhoades (1987)), explanatory variables are lagged 
one year to allow a reasonable time lag between a thrift’s firm-specific and 
environmental conditions and its takeover activity.   
      To test a bad (or inefficient) management hypothesis, we examine the relationship 
between cost inefficiency (CINEFF) and the likelihood of a thrift’s takeover (Hannan and 
Rhoades (1987), and Moore (1996)).   Under the bad management hypothesis, the 
coefficient of CINEFF is expected to be significant and positive, with more inefficient 
thrifts associated on average with takeovers.  An alternative explanation is that 
inefficiency can be an unattractive attribute signaling problems with the target (Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2000).  Due to the potential costs of bringing the firm around, acquiring 
firms may have stayed away from inefficient targets decreasing the likelihood of takeover 
for inefficient thrifts.  Under this alternative, the coefficient on CINEFF would be 
expected to be significantly negative instead. 
      Several firm-specific attributes are included to control for other factors expected to 
affect takeover probability.  SIZE is measured as the log of thrift’s total assets5 and is 
incorporated in the analysis to account for size related takeover incentives such as 
building market power.  Capital adequacy, CAP, a firm’s equity to assets ratio, is one of 
the variables often cited as a possible factor in affecting acquisition activity (Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2000, Hannan and Rhoades, 1987, and Moore, 1996).  Capitalization can 
                                                          
5 The results are robust to other size selections such as total assets and total equity.   We have also removed 
linearity and log-linearity in this variable by creating 5 size-class dummies.   Our results did not change. 
 12
affect the takeover activity in either direction:  On the one hand, high capital ratios in  
targets may be a desirable attribute to provide additional capital for an acquirer.  On the 
other hand, firms with high capital ratios may demand higher prices which may push 
acquiring firms towards less costly, inadequately capitalized firms that they could turn 
around by providing greater capital.  CAP also signals potential problems as it indicates 
the amount of safety buffer a firm has against insolvency risk. 
     Market share, MSH, is another variable that has received attention in the literature as a 
potential factor in takeover activity, with mixed implications.  Hannan and Rhoades 
(1987) argue that market share is a good attribute in a target since it provides “good 
market position” and “visibility,” and is expected to have a positive relationship with 
takeover probability.  Moore (1996), however, points out that a firm’s high market share 
can have a negative effect on the regulatory approval prospects of a takeover; hence a 
negative significant relationship would be expected.  Yet, he also argues that a firm’s low 
market share, indicating “lack of success in its marketplace,” may be a desirable attribute 
as a more successful acquirer may seek that firm for its turnaround potential.  A thrift’s 
market share for our study is measured in terms of its assets as a percentage of total assets 
of all thrifts in the state in which it operates.6  To control for asset portfolio differences 
that may have affected the likelihood of takeover, we include TRAD, the percentage of 
home mortgage assets held by a thrift.  The effect of TRAD on takeover probability is not 
immediately clear.  For instance, acquirers may prefer thrifts with high levels of TRAD to 
diversify their asset base, thus implying a positive relationship between takeover and 
TRAD.   On the other hand, in an industry where asset portfolio variation is limited, 
                                                          
6 Radecki (1998) argues that state, rather than city or county, provides better boundaries for retail banking 
markets. Geographic restrictions on within state branching were removed across the U.S. in almost all 
states by the end of 1992. 
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higher levels of TRAD may signal a lack of creativity on the part of management, and/or 
a lack of market breadth and depth with low potential for creativity in product offerings, 
thus a negative relationship.  To control for differences in risk that might be associated 
with takeovers, we include REPOS, the percentage of repossessed assets.  REPOS 
proxies for the quality of a thrift's loan portfolio.  With bad debt reserve recaptures 
required after 1996 for thrifts, a firm with larger REPOS might make a less attractive 
target. 
     Two additional variables are included to control for the economic environment in 
which the firms operate.  An MSA dummy is employed to distinguish different types of 
markets the targets are located in.  Moore (1996), for example, finds a greater probability 
of takeover for banks operating in non-rural markets that offer greater opportunity for 
growth.  A positive coefficient on this variable would provide evidence for the hypothesis 
that firms may target thrifts operating in more urban markets in the state.  Population 
growth percentage, GROWTH, is also included to account for expansion opportunities in 
the target market.   All else equal, growth prospects of the market may encourage the 
acquirers to target thrifts in this area (Hannan and Rhoades (1987)).  
     Finally we include six time dummy variables for 1994 through 1999, with the last year 
of 2000 omitted, to account for the year-effects.  
 
(Insert Table 1 about here)  
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3. Empirical Results 
3.1  Descriptive Statistics 
    Descriptive statistics for both groups of acquired and not-acquired firms are shown in 
Table 1.7  The differences in means test show that more acquired firms were located in 
urban markets (MSA dummy) with higher population growth (GROWTH) than non-
acquired firms, supporting the hypothesis that significant markets with growth 
opportunities potentially raise the probability of takeover.  Acquired firms seem to have 
less risky assets as measured with repossessed loans (REPOS) indicating that thrifts with 
risky assets are less desirable targets.  Finally acquired firms seem to be more cost 
efficient than not-acquired firms, providing at least descriptive evidence contrary to the 
bad management hypothesis.  Table 2 presents Pearson correlations between independent 
variables included in the logit analysis.  The measures of market share and size are 
correlated with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.48 which signals a possible need of 
these variables to be evaluated individually in the logit analysis.  Although most of the 
remaining variables seem to be correlated at significant levels, the magnitude of these 
correlations do not indicate potential multicollinearity problems (|<0.30|). 
     We now proceed to examine the logit results. 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
                                                          
7 The median test on the equality of medians is also performed for these variables (except dummy 
variables) with very similar results. 
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3.2  Logit Model Results 
     The results for the maximum likelihood logit regressions for the total sample are 
shown in Panel A of Table 3.8   The coefficient on CINEFF is negative and highly 
significant.  Cost inefficiency appears to have been an undesirable attribute in a firm,  
consistent with Wheelock and Wilson’s (2000) results.  Cost inefficient firms are 
negatively associated with takeovers during this period.  For other model variables, as 
predicted, thrifts with a higher risk profile, as measured by REPOs, are negative 
correlates of takeovers. TRAD, measuring thrift’s percentage of traditional loans, also has 
a significant, negative coefficient implying that firms with a greater fraction of traditional 
loans were less attractive as takeover targets.  This may indicate low desirability of 
concentrated portfolios, and reflecting perhaps the lack of greater adaptation to changing 
financial service markets.  High TRAD firms may potentially be less adaptive to change 
and this may be an undesirable quality in a world where diverse financial functions are 
being collected under one umbrella.  TRAD may also be an indicator of limited 
investment opportunities in the environment of the thrift in question.  It may indicate that 
there is limited potential to expand into newer products.   The coefficient on MSA 
dummy variable is positive and highly significant as evidenced in the previous studies, 
supporting the argument that the firms within urban markets were more desirable targets 
than smaller rural markets.   This also indirectly supports our earlier contention that in a 
changing environment potential growth in a variety of products is considered desirable. 
     The coefficients on the other environmental variable of population growth, 
GROWTH, and other firm-specific characteristics of size, capital ratio and market share 
                                                          
8  Due to inclusion of repeated observations on individual firms in the data set, we obtained and reported 
results using robust (Huber/White)variance estimates which produce “correct” standard errors even if the 
observations are correlated. 
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(SIZE, CAP, and MSH) are insignificant at conventional levels.  The signs on these 
coefficients, although insignificant, suggest that larger thrifts, thrifts in high population 
growth areas, and better capitalized thrifts have been considered to be more attractive for 
acquisition.  Due to the  high correlation reported on Table 2 between market share and 
size, the analysis is repeated using these variables individually in estimating equation (4) 
with no change in results (not reported).9   
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
     We further investigate if there were different incentives for takeover activity for 
different types of acquirers.  Out of our 401 thrift takeover sample, 282 represent thrifts 
taken over by banks, and 119 taken over by other thrifts.   Since banks and thrifts may 
represent different markets of retail banking system with different business models, we 
performed multinomial logit estimation of equation (4) to investigate whether their 
acquisition incentives differed as well.   This model includes as a dependent variable 
three outcomes of no takeover, takeover by a bank, and takeover by a thrift.  The results 
are reported in Panel B of Table 3.   If the acquirer is a bank, the explanatory variables 
CINEFF, MSA, TRAD, and REPOS show the same direction and significance as 
discussed above for the overall logit model shown in Panel A.  Additionally, for banks, 
population growth had  a significant, positive relationship to takeover   Takeovers by 
banks tended to occur if a thrift operated in a more attractive, potentially higher growth 
market, as indicated by the positive, significant coefficient on GROWTH.  
                                                          
9 The effect of year dummies are not reported in tables since they are not of direct interest. But casual 
inspection shows that years map out the relationship between the years and the volume of takeover 
activities within those years, with highest significant coefficients on years with the greatest number of 
takeovers in our testing period. 
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     If the acquirer is another thrift, though, results change.  With the exception of MSA, 
which holds its direction and significance the same, the other variables that showed 
significant effects lose their significance at conventional levels.  For example, 
inefficiency and repossessed assets were still undesirable, but insignificant attributes.  
Size, on the other hand, seems to have been an important factor in thrifts’ target choices. 
Interestingly, though, thrift acquirers chose firms with low state thrift asset market shares. 
Consistent with Moore (1996), we find the coefficient on MSH significantly negative 
when the acquirer is a thrift.   Moore (1996) notes that such a negative relationship 
reflects a lack of  market success as a desirable characteristic to acquirers, perhaps for the 
thrift’s turnaround potential by a successful acquirer.  Although this study does not 
examine acquirer motives, which remains for future research, the differences in 
characteristics of taken over versus non-taken over thrifts suggest different motives for 
thrift versus commercial bank acquirers during this period.  Banks appear to have 
preferred to acquire thrifts with efficient management.  They also showed preferences for 
thrifts that operated in attractive, higher growth, urban markets, and thrifts that had 
already adapted to new market conditions by engaging in non-traditional lending.  Thrift 
acquirers, however, showed preferences for larger thrifts that had less market success in 
terms of a lower state market share, perhaps for their turnaround potential or possibly to 
avoid anti-competitive factors that may reduce the chance of a successful merger, as 
Moore (1996) suggests. 
 
 
 18
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
     This paper is the first to examine takeovers for the U.S. thrift industry during a period 
of market liberalization and widespread takeover activity, 1994 to 2000.  We focus on the 
relationship between cost efficiency and takeovers.  First, we estimate yearly cost 
inefficiency scores using a stochastic cost frontier methodology for all firms from 1994 to 
2000.  In the second stage, we examine the relationship between managerial cost 
inefficiency and the likelihood of a firm’s takeover, among other factors.  Contrary to a 
‘bad management hypothesis,’ that predicts inefficient firms will be culled from the 
industry, targets appear on average to be more cost efficient firms.  However, examining 
differences in the characteristics of firms taken over by banks versus by other thrifts, this 
relationship only holds for bank acquirers.   Bank acquirers also appeared to target thrifts 
in high growth, urban markets, and thrifts that adapted to change in terms of engaging in 
greater non-traditional lending.  For thrift acquirers, targets appeared to be larger with 
lower thrift market asset shares, which as suggested by Moore (1996), may indicate a 
lack of market success.  Our results for bank takeovers are consistent with those of 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) examining an earlier period and using a different 
methodology.  The result that more efficient thrifts were taken over by banks bodes well 
for the health of the banking industry, but suggests for the thrift industry a removal of its 
more efficient firms.   
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 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for thrifts acquired and not acquired during 1995-2001 
 
Variables Sample N Mean σ t-stata 
Size 
(Log) 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
2533   
 401 
2132 
12.273 
12.343 
12.259 
1.470 
1.474 
1.469 
 
 
-1.05 
Capital 
Ratio 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
2533 
 401 
2132 
0.090 
0.093 
0.089 
0.047 
0.042 
0.048 
 
 
-1.51 
Market 
Share 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
 2533 
 401 
2132 
0.057 
0.055 
0.058 
0.128 
0.119 
0.130 
 
 
0.479 
MSA 
Dummy 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
 2533 
 401 
2132 
0.694 
0.770 
0.680 
0.460 
0.420 
0.466 
 
 
-3.6*** 
Population 
Growth 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
2533 
 401 
2132 
1.624 
2.037 
1.546 
1.685 
2.097 
1.584 
 
 
-5.38*** 
Cost 
Inefficiency 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
2533 
 401 
2132 
0.234 
0.193 
0.242 
0.177 
0.153 
0.181 
 
 
 5.10*** 
Traditional 
Loan % 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
2533 
 401 
2132 
0.463 
0.451 
0.465 
0.184 
0.173 
0.186 
 
 
 1.32 
Repossessed 
Assets % 
All 
Acquired 
Not Acquired 
2533 
 401 
2132 
0.004 
0.003 
0.004 
0.010 
0.006 
0.010 
 
 
2.08** 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
Size (SIZE) = Log of Total Assets (in thousands) 
Capital Ratio (CAP) = Equity to Total Assets 
Market Share (MSH) = Thrift’s Assets to Total State Thrift Assets 
MSA dummy (MSA) = 1if in an MSA, 0 otherwise. 
Population Growth  (GROWTH) = Annual Growth in Population in a Firm’s Home State 
Cost Inefficiency (CINEFF) = Thrift’s Controllable Managerial Inefficiency Score 
Traditional Loan % (TRAD)= Thrift’s Percentage of Traditional Home-Mortgage Assets 
Repossessed Assets %  (REPOS) = Thrift’s Percentage of Repossessed Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a The t-statistics refer to t-tests comparing the means of the two samples. 
***, ** p<0.01 and 0.05, respectively 
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Table 2 
Pearson correlations between independent variables  
 
 Cost  
In-efficiency 
Log 
Size 
Capital 
Ratio 
Market  
Share 
MSA 
Dummy 
Pop. 
Growth 
Trad. 
Loan 
% 
Log 
Size 
 
.029 
      
Capital 
Ratio 
 
.073*** 
 
 
-.196*** 
     
Market  
Share 
 
-.019 
 
.48*** 
 
-.039* 
    
MSA 
Dummy 
 
.150*** 
 
.297*** 
 
-.076*** 
 
.077*** 
   
Pop. 
Growth 
 
-.058*** 
 
-.08*** 
 
-.010 
 
-.07*** 
 
.003 
  
Trad. 
Loan % 
 
-.193*** 
 
-.11*** 
 
-.09*** 
 
-.085***
 
-.024 
 
.031 
 
Repos. 
Assets % 
 
.061*** 
 
-.018 
 
-.068*** 
 
-.037* 
 
.088*** 
 
.058*** 
 
.001 
 
Variable definitions: See Table 1 for definitions. 
 
***, **, * p<.01, p<.05 and p<.10 respectively. 
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Table 3 
Logit Model Results 
 
Panel A: Results of Overall Logit Model Examining the Determinants of All Acquisitions 
Dependent Variable = 1 if acquired; 0, otherwise 
 
Panel A: 
All 
Constant CINEFF SIZE CAP MSH MSA GROWTH  TRAD REPOS 
Coefficient -3.309 -1.434 0.070 1.720 -0.538 0.523 0.050 -0.800 -26.138 
Marginal 
Effectsa 
N/A -0.168 0.008 0.201 -0.063 0.057b 0.006 -0.094 -3.056 
z-stat  -2.70*** 1.12 1.10 -0.77 3.07*** 0.98 -1.92* -2.46** 
          
N 
Acq.  N 
2533 
401 
Pseudo-R2 
Wald chi2 
0.072 
139.32*
** 
      
 
 
Panel B: Results of Multinomial Logit Model Examining the Determinants of Respective Bank and Thrift 
Acquisitions 
Dependent Variable = 1 if acquired by bank; 2 if acquired by thrift; 0, otherwise. 
 
Panel B: 
Banks 
Constant CINEFF SIZE CAP MSH MSA GROWTH TRAD REPOS 
Coefficient -2.602 -1.766 -0.001 1.529 0.279 0.480 0.132 -0.977 -38.544 
Marginal 
Effectsa 
N/A -0.153 -0.001 0.128 0.039 0.038b 0.012 -0.085 -3.342 
z-stat  -3.03*** -0.16 0.92 0.65 2.52** 2.33** -2.14** -2.49** 
          
Acq.  N 
 
282         
Thrifts          
Coefficient -7.432 -0.643 0.267 1.968 -4.679 0.653 -0.103 -0.278 -12.682 
Marginal 
Effectsa 
N/A -0.014 0.008 0.054 -0.141 0.017b -0.003 -0.005 -0.265 
z-stat  -0.52 2.94*** 1.01 -2.79*** 2.42** -1.45 -0.32 -0.80 
          
Acq.  N 
N 
119 
2533 
Pseudo-R2 
Wald chi2 
0.076 
175.83*** 
      
Variable definitions: See Table 1 for definitions. ***, **, * p<.01, p<.05 and p<.10 respectively. 
a Marginal effects reported are calculated at the means of independent variables. 
bMarginal effect of MSA is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.   
